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I
INTRODUCTION:

THE NEED FOR REFORM

The conventional malpractice system has many problems, and complaints
about law and lawyers are hardly new.' Today, however, tort law operates on
a broad scale, has widespread economic impact through liability insurance,
and influences access to medical care and the nature of medical practice. 2
In brief, the sometimes erratic, usually slow, and always expensive process
of today's payment system undercuts its ability to compensate victims. Its
failure to reach most avoidable injuries, its seemingly haphazard case-by-case
determinations, and its lack of scientific legitimacy hamper its ability to deter
injury. The system thus fails to achieve the two main goals of tort law.3
Moreover, providers' mistrust of the system encourages wasteful and even
harmful "defensive medicine," which is the main reason for health policy
concern. 4 Meanwhile, quality control is unduly divorced from the malpractice
Copyright © 1991 by Law and Contemporary Problems
*
Kraft Eidman Professor of Medicine and the Law, and Director, Health Law Program,
University of Texas Health Science Center, Houston, Texas.
**
Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
This article reports on a study principally funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, grant
no. 12411, as well as support from the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, for Dr.
Tancredi's time, which support is gratefully acknowledged. The authors wish to acknowledge their
current Urban Institute colleagues Daniel S. Gaylin and Philip J. Held, together with earlier
colleagues in the development of ACEs, particularly Clark C. Havighurst of Duke Law School, as well
as Dr. John R. Boyden of Salt Lake City and James A. Henderson, Jr., of Cornell Law School. The
authors also want to thank their medical consultants, most notably Drs. Bruce D. Browner, Robert K.
Creasy, and Frank G. Moody of the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston.
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system, even as there are grave concerns about the prevalence of iatrogenic
injury and negligence.

5

Hence, reform is very definitely in order. However, reforms need to offer
a demonstrable improvement, not merely "less of the same," like
conventional tort reform's pro-defendant changes in legal rules. 6 Some
conventional tort reform does make a difference, reducing claims and
payments. 7 Yet it can be attacked, politically and constitutionally, as a "takeaway" with insufficiently compensating benefit. 8 Moreover, conventional
reform can neither improve deterrence and compensation nor allay providers'
defensiveness toward the conventional legal process. 9 Better reforms would
address more of the avoidable bad outcomes in medicine, resolve medical
injuries more fairly and cheaply, and discourage defensive medicine. This
article reports on the current state of the art with regard to a leading type of
malpractice reform. We argue that reforms based on "acceleratedcompensation events" ("ACEs")' 0 would best address the twin goals of
making compensation more equitable and avoiding bad outcomes in medical
care. Part II provides a general introduction to ACES; Part III outlines and
Part IV evaluates the potential advantages and disadvantages of ACE-based
Medicine, 200 Science 879 (1978); Congressional Res Serv, US Congress, Medical Malpractice: A Report
Prepared at the Request of the House Committee on Ways & Means 101-26 (Gov't Printing Office, April 16,
1990).
5. Don Harper Mills, John S. Boyden & David S. Rubsamen, Report on the Medical Insurance
Feasibility Study (Sutter, 1977) (sponsored jointly by the California Medical and Hospital
Associations), summarized in Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study-A Technical
Summary, 128 W J Med 360 (1978) ("Report on the Feasibility Study"); see generally Harvard Medical
Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient
Compensation in Vew York ch 6 (Harvard U Press, 1990) (report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study
to the State of New York) ("Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers").
6. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary
Report Card, 22 UC Davis L Rev 499 (Spring 1989), reprinted in 3 Nat'l Ins L Rev 217 (Autumn 1989).
7. There is growing consensus that the "big three" of tort reforms are caps on awards, changes
in the statute of limitations, and collateral source offset. See, for example, Patricia M. Danzon, The
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L & Contemp Probs 57 (Spring
1986); Frank A. Sloan & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Crises, Response and Effects, Health
Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull (May 1989) (summarizing findings as of early 1989); Stephen Zuckerman,
Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice
Insurance Premiums, 27 Inquiry 167 (Summer 1990).
8. See, for example, James F. Blumstein & David R. Smith, Constitutional Attacks on Medical
Malpractice Laws, in L. Andrew, ed, Legal Liability and Quality Assurance in Newborn Screening (1985)
("Constitutional Attacks").
9. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Problems and Solutions in Medical Malpractice, in Robert E. Litan & Peter
W. Huber, eds, The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 274-90 (Brookings
Institution, 1991) ("Problems and Solutions").
10. Earlier in ACE development, the American Bar Association Commission popularized the
term "designated compensable events," or DCEs. Am Bar Ass'n Commission on Medical
Professional Liability, Designated Compensable Event System: A Feasibility Study (Am Bar Ass'n, 1979)
("Feasibility Study"). Others subsequently followed this nomenclature. See, for example, Am Med
Ass'n, A ProposedAlternative to the CivilJustice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based,
Administrative System (Am Med Ass'n, 1988) (Special Society Medical Liability Project) ("A Proposed
Alternative"). The DCE nomenclature emphasized the AMA process of designating ACEs. At this stage
of seeking to implement ACE systems as a payment reform, among other uses, it is more appropriate
to emphasize ACEs' major benefit of acceleratingcompensation.

Page 147: Spring 1991]

ACCELERATED COMPENSATION EVENTS

reforms. Finally, Part V describes some practical prerequisites to a successful
implementation of such reforms.
II
"ACCELERATED-COMPENSATION

EVENTS" AS A REFORM

Accelerated-compensation events are medically caused injuries that should
not normally occur.II ACEs do not cover all injuries, just classes of adverse
outcomes that are usually, although not invariably, avoidable through good
care. 12 Medical experts create ACEs by reviewing information on injuries,
then generalizing to sets of events that qualify for designation as ACEs. 13 The
ACE concept is now in its third generation of development.' 4 Initial, largely
conceptual work occurred in the early 1970s.1 5 Later in that decade, the first
two detailed ACE listings were developed and their feasibility analyzed, using
limited information compiled on malpractice insurance claims.' 6 The most
recent research on ACE approaches has developed additional listings and
undertaken more thoroughgoing research about the likely effects of ACEs, in
the first empirical application of the ACE alternative to "real world" cases.17
11. The focus on events that should not normally occur is not unique to ACEs. Since the mid19 7 0 s, Sweden has had a nontort compensation system for certain medical injuries that are not the
unavoidable consequences of medical care. See, for example, Eva D. Cohen & Samuel P. Korper, The
Swedish No-Fault Patient Compensation Program: Provisions and Preliminary Findings, 1976 Ins L J 70.
However, the Swedish scheme excludes injury from drugs and diagnosis; it also makes case-by-case
decisions rather than creating a list in advance.
12. ACEs thus do not embody true no-fault principles, but rather constitute a selective no-fault
approach when used for reform of malpractice payment. ACEs focus predominantly on statistical
"avoidability." See footnotes 19, 23 for discussion of this issue. Some adverse outcomes of medical
care are unavoidable. An illustration would be a patient who undergoes an unexpected cardiac arrest
during general surgery, despite appropriately conducted pre-surgery diagnostic studies that failed to
reveal evidence of existing cardiac disease.
13. On the creation of ACE lists, see especially Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Creating a Selective No-Fault System for Malpractice and Quality Reform: Methodology of AcceleratedCompensation Events (ACEs) (working paper 1991) ("Creatinga Selective System"); Laurence R. Tancredi,
Identifying Avoidable Adverse Events in Medicine, 12 Med Care 935 (1974); see generally sources cited at
notes 14-22.
14. For an extended descriptive analysis of ACE development, see Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating
a Selective System (cited in note 13).
15. Laurence R. Tancredi, The Analytics of a No-Fault System for Medical Malpractice: A Medical
Outcome Insurance System, (Yale Law School honors thesis, unpub 1972); Clark C. Havighurst &
Laurence R. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality
Assurance, 51 Milbank Mem Fund Q 125 (1974), reprinted in 1974 Ins LJ 69; Clark C. Havighurst,
"Medical Adversity Insurance -- Has Its Time Come?, 1975 Duke LJ 1233; Tancredi, 12 Med Care 935
(cited in note 13).
16. John R. Boyden, Jr., & Laurence R. Tancredi, Identification of Designated Compensable Events
(DCEs), in Am Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Medical Professional Liability, Designated Compensable Event
System: A Feasibility Study 11-51 (Am Bar Ass'n, 1979) (using insurance data, medical literature, and
physician panel judgment) ("Identification of DCEs"). One listing was also developed by Sue Rankin,
see Havighurst, 1975 Duke LJ at 1256-59 (cited in note 15) (using medical literature).
17. See generally Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System (cited in note 13); Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Laurence R. Tancredi & Daniel S. Gaylin, Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the
Performanceof a Selective No-Fault System, 265 J Am Med Ass'n 2835 (1991). Others have also suggested
ACE or ACE-like systems. See James A. Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Md
L Rev 659 (1982) (describing DCE approach). Professor Henderson was a contributor to the
American Bar Association Commission report. See Am Bar Ass'n, Feasibility Study at 4 (cited in note
10); Barry M. Manuel, Professional Liability-A No-Fault Solution, 322 New EngJ Med 627, 628 (1990)

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 2

The three main criteria for listing an adverse medical outcome as an ACE
are:' 8 (1) avoidability: events are medically caused and moderately or highly
preventable as a class' 9 ; (2) detectability: each ACE class is readily specified,
with clear boundaries that exclude similar non-ACEs; and (3) absence of bad
incentive effects: 20 listing as an ACE does not distort medical decisionmaking.
The ACE approach differs markedly from conventional litigation or
settlement of liability insurance claims. The current system is based on afterthe-fact, individualized determinations of fault by lay jurors. In contrast,
ACEs are based on an advance listing of professionally selected classes of bad
outcomes deemed usually avoidable on a probabilistic basis. The law relies
on idiosyncratic testimony about allegedly faulty processes of care in particular
cases. ACE categories rely on generalized expert judgment about statistical
outcomes of medical care. In addition, the law uses a formalized adversary
process, ultimately conducted in courtrooms. The ACE process, depending
on the precise type of reform instituted, is meant to resemble practices of
private or public insurers in resolving non-liability claims. 2' ACEs, being
grounded in medical outcomes, also differ from most approaches to quality
monitoring and assessment in medicine.
The classic prototypical ACE is a surgical instrument unintentionally left
within a patient, although many less obvious events are also included.
Experts can agree that such events should not normally occur, given good
care. In any particular case there may be a reasonable explanation for how an
instrument was left despite good care, but an ACE-based system seeks to
avoid such expensive and slow investigation and arguments. Table 1 lists the
eleven overall categories of ACEs, such as "Nerve Injuries" and "Puncture or
Laceration Wounds."
Each category is illustrated with a simplified
description of a sample ACE class. Recent research has developed an ACE
listing for obstetrics and gynecology, and has improved upon earlier listings
for general surgery and orthopedic surgery. 22 For example, experts reviewing
adverse events in obstetrics and gynecology agreed in advance on forty-eight
(calling for boards of physician-specialists to create "list of approved compensable medical
injuries"); Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance (MM!): A No-Fault Insurance Proposalfor
Resolving the Medical Malpractice Controversy, 1988 Tort & Ins LJ 552.
18. Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System (cited in note 13).
19. In our most recent work on creating lists of ACEs, the definition applied was 70% or more
avoidable. Id. However, different definitions could be applied for different purposes or according to
differing judgment about the relative importance to the system of opposite shortcomings-failing to
include avoidable injuries versus including some that are not avoidable.
20. In this way, ACEs seek to avoid creating motivations to practice a kind of defensive
medicine. See discussion at notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
21. On the different possible types of ACE-based reform, see discussion at notes 25-28 and
accompanying text. ACEs used as an alternative payment system for malpractice also feature
different rules of damages. See discussion at notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
22. Table 1,adopted from Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System (cited in note 13), is
drawn from the three ACE listings: "ACE's for Surgery, 11/30/89," "ACE's for Orthopedic
Surgery, 11/21/89," and "ACE's for Obstetrics and Gynecology, 01/17/90," all copyright University
of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (copy on file with authors). These three specialties are
the top three in terms of numbers of claims against physicians. See discussion accompanying note
96.
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classes of adverse outcomes for their specialty, grouped within the eleven
major categories.
TABLE 1
CATEGORIES OF

ACEs WITH SAMPLE LISTINGS

I. INFECTIONS

Decubitus ulcer during inpatient care.
II. NERVE INJURIES

Complications (blindness, brain damage) secondary to air embolisms during surgical
removal of an acoustic neuroma.
III. OTHER COMPLICATIONS OF PROCEDURES

Infarction of bowel secondary to hernia repair.
IV. PUNCTURE OR LACERATION WOUNDS

Complications (including death) from pneumothorax following subclavian venopuncture and closed thoracotomy.
V. JOINT AND DEVICE MISPLACEMENT

Postoperative displacement of any internal orthopedic device which was applied during
that operative procedure.
VI. DRUG AND BLOOD DISORDERS

Complications (for example, hypotension, shock, or death) secondary to anticoagulant
treatment in preparation for surgery.
VII. FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE

Complications from failure to diagnose and treat hypoglycemia in a newborn.
VIII. FOREIGN BODIES

Complications (including death) from foreign body unintentionally left in the operative
site after any surgical operation or procedure.
IX. FALLS

Complications from falls from table during surgical operation or procedure or during
childbirth.
X. VASCULAR EVENTS

Complications (severe edema, pulmonary embolism, etc.) secondary to phlebitis and
thrombophlebitis (deep vessels of lower extremities) following a surgical procedure.
XI. DEATH
Death during surgical operations (or immediately after) other than with a high risk
patient.
Source: ACE Listings for Obstetrics/Gynecology, General Surgery, and Orthopedic Surgery, (c)
University of Texas, cited in note 22. Adapted from Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System
(cited in Note 13).

ACEs can be used in a variety of ways, from replacing much of tort law to
assisting medical quality review. More specifically, the options include ACEbased reforms in payment, dispute resolution, insurance practices, and quality
of medical care. As a payment reform, ACEs wholly replace much or most malpractice litigation with an insurance system, determining simplified payment
amounts for listed events-for example, in obstetrics-without individualized
fault-finding. 23 The new process would resemble the factfinding and decision
23. Because ACEs' payment would occur automatically, without investigations of fault, the
approach was initially dubbed "no-fault," see references to "no-fault" in Tancredi, The .nalytics of a
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processes of public or private insurance settlement (for non-liability claims).
Non-ACE injuries would remain in a case-by-case adjudicatory system, presumably a fault-based one. This residual mechanism could be today's tort
24
regime or some reform alternative.
Other ACE-based reforms leave in place the entire tort system: As a dispute-resolution reform, ACEs are used in conjunction with the current fault
system. The ACE listings can assist either (a) pretrial screening or medical

review panels or (b) alternative dispute resolution, like arbitration. Knowledge of definitive classes of avoidable injury would be relevant to fault-based
dispute resolution, even though ACEs are not themselves fault-based.2 5 As an
insurance reform, ACEs help existing liability insurers either to resolve current
cases or to manage their insureds' risk, again relying on the listings' informational content. Alternatively, ACE listings can form the basis for a new kind of
insurance for medical injury, defining the "insurable event" to be covered.
This could occur under first-party, patient-purchased coverage, 26 or medical
providers could buy such coverage on behalf of their patients. As a tool for
quality reform, ACEs are used only for quality research, monitoring, and feedback by peer reviewers, risk managers, and others. As a statistical basis for
monitoring and analyzing bad outcomes, ACEs would be quite congruent with
other outcomes-oriented attempts to improve quality of care.
No-Fault System (cited in note 15); Havighurst & Tancredi, 51 Milbank Mem Fund Q (cited in note
15), thus borrowing for medical care a term popularized for automobile insurance. Alan I. Widiss, et
al, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Action: The Experiences in Massachusetts, Florida, Delaware and Michigan
(Oceana, 1977). Unlike auto no-fault, however, which pays for virtually every auto accident, in health
care no-fault does not intend to pay for every injury, illness, or death occurring in the course of
medical treatment. Such full no-fault would tax the medical system for problems not of its making
and would be unduly expensive. Instead, ACEs explicitly focus on preventable classes of injuries.
Because of this emphasis, an ACE payment reform could readily be called a "quasi-fault" system.
Eligibility for payment is quite selective, but payment itself occurs without regard to individual fault.
Hence we have also spoken of ACEs as a "selective no-fault" system. Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin,
265 J Am Med Ass'n 2835 (cited in note 17).
24. One possible case-by-case alternative is an administrative agency to adjudicate medical
malpractice, proposed by the American Medical Association and others. See generally Am Med
Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative (cited in note 10). Another is mandatory arbitration. Both would
supplant conventional tort litigation, but nonetheless would continue to rely on individualized faultfinding through an adversary process.
25. The question arises whether an ACE list would be admissible in court in support of an
individualized finding of negligence or to shift the burden of proof in res ipsa fashion. Counting in
favor of admissibility would be the relevance of ACEs to good medical practice; counting against
would be the fact that factors other than deviation from custom are used to create them. See James
A. Henderson, Jr., Use of ACEs Other Than as the Basis of a Compensation System, in Am Bar Ass'n,
Feasibility Study (cited in note 10). The issue is similar to that of nonmandatory guidelines for medical
practice. See, for example, Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the
Current MalpracticeEnvironment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 UC Davis L Rev 421 (1989); Mark A. Hall,
The Defensive Effect of Medical PracticePolicies in MalpracticeLitigation, 54 L & Contemp Probs 119 (Spring
1991); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L &
Contemp Probs 87 (Spring 1991). Whether or not ACE listings would be admissible evidence of
negligence, parties negotiating private settlements could find them useful supplements to expert
witnesses.
26. First-party insurance would resemble the patient "flight insurance" often discussed in the
1970s. For a 1980s discussion, see Physician Ins Ass'n Am, A Comprehensive Review of Alternatives to the
Present System of Resolving Medical Liability Claims 74-77 (Physician Ins Ass'n Am, 1989) ("A
Comprehensive Review").
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Historically, ACEs were invented as a means to effect payment reform, 2 7
and this article gives most attention to that prospect. Such reform requires
legislation or private contracts to supplant tort law, and would face significant
legal challenges, both in legislatures and on judicial review. 2 8 However, the
ACE concept is potentially also very useful for the "lesser" reforms of dispute
resolution, insurance practice, and medical quality assurance-reforms with
major potential for improving practice and without major legal hurdles for
implementation. Hence, this article deals with the relevance of ACEs to all
four types of reform options.
ACEs are very flexible in design and implementation. Therefore, they can
be shaped to respond to the advances of medical intervention and to social
and economic exigencies of the health care system. Three qualities of ACEs
make this flexibility possible. First, ACEs can be calibrated to be broad or
narrow for each type of care addressed. The number of adverse outcomes on
an ACE list can be altered to meet broader objectives such as social or economic considerations. In addition, the description of the ACE classes can
reflect policy objectives. For example, if cost is an issue in the acceptance of a
particular ACE, it can be more narrowly described to meet the criteria for
inclusion as an ACE and also to assure the economic viability of the health
care delivery system. As an illustration, a list of obstetrical ACEs might be
limited to the most serious economic injuries, leaving the remainder to the
tort system. In this way, ACEs are similar to but far broader than Virginia and
Florida's very limited alternative systems for severe "birth-related neurolog2 9
ical injury."Second, ACEs can address more or fewer areas of medical care. The ACE
approach might be most appropriate in the beginning for surgical episodes
involving such specialties as obstetrics and gynecology and general surgery,
leaving other care to the existing system or another alternative. Including
only a few specialties' care under ACEs allows for practical experience on the
implementation of the ACE approach. A replacement system, therefore, can
be implemented gradually, monitored for effects, and altered to meet broader
social, economic, and medical objectives. Third, ACEs can serve limited purposes within the existing system. This insight lies behind the three nonpayment-oriented reforms noted above.

27. See sources cited in note 15.
28. See, for example, Blumstein & Smith, Constitutional Attacks (cited in note 8). On private
contracts, see generally Randall R. Bovbjerg & Clark C. Havighurst, Medical Malpractice: Can the
Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 Law & Contemp Probs 1 (Spring 1986) (entire symposium).
29. Va Code §§ 38.2-5001 to -5021 (Michie, Supp 1988); Fla Stat §§ 766.301 to 316 (West,
Supp 1989). See, for example, Ronald S. Latz, No-Fault Liability and Medical Malpractice: A liability
Analysis, 10 J Legal Med 479, 495-96 (1989); James A. Henderson, The Virginia Birth-Related Injury
Compensation Act: Limited No-Fault Statutes as Solutions to the "Medical Malpractice Crisis, - in Victoria P.
Rostow & Roger J. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical Professional Liability and the Deliver, of Obstetrical Care 194
(Nat'l Acad Press, 1989) ("Liability and Obstetrical Care").
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III
PROS AND CONS OF

ACE-BASED

REFORMS:

THEORY

Using ACEs to find and resolve medical injuries more scientifically has
many attractive features. 30 This section spells them out, and later sections
examine them in more detail. First of all, as a payment reform, ACEs promise
more widespread and fairer compensation. The listing aids claim detection and
helps avoid complicated disputes about responsibility. A simpler, insurancestyle process makes it possible to resolve smaller cases. Standardized rules of
damages would be more uniformly applied, making payments more
consistent, hence fairer and more predictable. Further, use of an insurance
process promises prompt compensation and early rehabilitation. Promptly
compensated patients can "get on with their lives." Litigation delays such
recovery, 3 ' and liability rules perversely give less money to those who have
rehabilitated themselves in the interim. In addition, more efficient administration
should avoid litigation expenses that are-at least twice as high for malpractice
as for workers' compensation, and four times higher than for health
insurance.3 2 Savings should occur under both payment reforms and dispute
resolution reforms.
Moreover, advance, expert determination of objective ACEs will give
health professionals greater confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the system,
whatever the nature of ACE reform. ACEs' outcomes-orientation and greater
acceptance by practitioners should also promote better prevention of medically
caused injuries, plus other, longer-run quality advantages: Just creating the
list helps focus research and quality control on injury avoidance. ACEs will
serve to create a basic framework now insufficiently agreed upon for studying
the epidemiology of adverse outcomes and for providing feedback to
practitioners. Helpful feedback would include not only the incidence or
prevalence of specific ACEs, but also methods for avoiding their occurrence.
ACE analysis can also assess the comparative risks of medical intervention in a
variety of settings.
30. This section draws heavily on a listing of pros and cons in Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265
J Am Med Ass'n at 2837-38 (cited in note 17). Other writing on ACEs or DCEs makes many of these
points; see especially Laurence R. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 L & Contemp Probs
277 (Spring 1986).
31. The median malpractice claim occurs thirteen months after injury and takes a further
seventeen or twenty-three months to resolve for unpaid and paid claims respectively, according to a
national survey of malpractice claims closed in 1984. US Gen'l Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice:
Characteristicsof Claims Closed in 1984, 32-33 (April 1987) (GAO/HRD-87-55) ("Claims Closed in 1984").
Paid claims take longer to close than unpaid, and large claims take longer than smaller claims.
Insurers take almost five years to pay out half of their claims dollars for a given year, according to
more complete insurance industry statistics compiled by Best's Reproductions of Convention Statements,
see Frank A. Sloan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Penny Githens, Insuring Medical Malpractice Table 6.1
(Oxford U Press, 1991). Some litigation can take very long indeed. The Government Accounting
Office found a range of time from filing to closure of I to 132 months; for one published history of an
.obstetrics case that ran almost twenty-six years, see Jack Dimmer, My Malpractice Ordeal is Over-After
Only 26 Years, 66 Medical Economics 50 (October 2, 1989).
32. Randall R. Bovbjerg, et al,Juries andJustice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created
Equal?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Winter 1991); see also discussion at Part IVB.
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In addition, reductions in nonproductive defensive medicine would occur for three,.
reasons. First, the ACE approach obviates the need for a nonproductive
record compiled solely as potential evidence in the event a malpractice claim
is made. Second, the ACE system is constructed such that only true
prevention can avoid responsibility for an ACE occurrence. Going through
the motions is not enough.3 3 Third, ACEs often incorporate positive
guidelines to improve care and would encourage further guidelines
development. 34 Improved physician-patient relations should also accompany the
shrinking of the current adversary system and its often acrimonious
35
disputes.
As the main quality-oriented payment reform, ACEs have considerable
advantages over other so-called no-fault approaches. As the main reform
based on predetermined classes of outcomes,3 6 ACEs have considerable
advantages over all forms of case-by-case disputation. ACEs are superior not
only to litigation but also to alternatives like the American Medical
Association plan. 3 7

Case-by-case process, especially when fault-based, is

inherently more protracted and costly.
Some theoretical objections have been raised about the ACE concept.
Critics allege, first, that constructing an ACE list is infeasible on technical
grounds. Opponents often assert that ACE lists will be hard to develop and
harder yet to apply. 38 This argument applies to any use of ACEs. It is also
objected that little actual "reform" can occur, because so few injuries can be
included in any practical ACE list for any type of reform. Thus, any use of
33. Under an ACE-based system, it would remain important to know what procedures were
done or omitted, and under what circumstances. Thus, accurate record keeping would be important
to evaluating ACEs as it is to good medical care. Moreover, where there is medical consensus or
epidemiological evidence of the usefulness of diagnostic procedures, ACEs call for them to be done.
However, procedures of little or no medical value would have no usefulness for ACEs, either.
However, depending on the extent to which residual tort claims still apply, defensiveness about them
could continue to a certain degree. There are reasons to expect overall defensiveness to decline, see
discussion at Part IVC.
34. Tancredi & Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System (cited in note 13).
35. On the unpleasantness of litigation, especially for medical practitioners, see Bovbjerg,
Problems and Solutions at 276-77 (cited in note 9).
36. Virginia and Florida in the last few years have enacted state-run payment systems for infants
severely brain-injured by medical process at birth, see note 29, but the statutes are so restrictive that
as of this writing very few claims have been made tinder either system.
37. See generally Am Med Ass'n, .AProposed AWltenative (cited in note 10); Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Reforming a Proposed Tort Reform: Improving on the American Medical Association"s Proposed .Administrative
Tribunal for Mfedical M1alpractice. I Courts. Health Science & L 19 (July 1990). Yet ACEs are not
incompatible with other proposed reforms that seek to remove decisions about medical injury out of
litigation. ACE-based payment reform could readily be coupled with additional reform of the caseby-case system needed to handle residual, non-ACE cases. See note 24 and accompanying text.
38. Historically, the first objection was that medically caused injuries simply cannot be separated
from risks of underlying conditions. David S. Rubsamen, No-Fault Liability fo.Adverse .lediral Events,
117 California Med 78, 78 (1972); Robert E. Keeton, Compensationfor Medical .Accidents, 121 U Pa L
Rev 590, 594 (1973). Subsequently, other commentators made the related claim that any feasible
listing would be very difficult to effectuate. William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages,
and Deterrence. 298 New Eng. Med 1282. 1282 (1978). Guido Calabresi, The Problem of.1Malpractice:
Trying to Round Out the Cicle and Richard A. Epstein. Medical .1Ialpractice. Its Cause and Cure. both in
Simon Rottenberg, ed, The Economics of Medical Walpractice 233 and 245 respectively (Am Enterprise
Inst, 1978).
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ACEs will leave almost all of the current system unchanged.3 9 A third
criticism is that few savings on administration are possible. The ACEs that
would be removed from the tort system under any payment-system reform are
(by definition) avoidable injuries, in which liability is usually obvious. Hence,
ACEs are (by hypothesis) now quickly and inexpensively resolved through
informal insurance settlement, without costly litigation or trial. 40 Finally, and
contrary to the second objection, it is argued that a huge increase in cases will
result from any "no-fault" system of coverage. This increase, critics say, will
make any new ACE payment system impractically expensive. 4'
IV
THE LIKELY PERFORMANCE OF ACES:

EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION

Over the course of almost two decades of ACE development, research has
addressed and resolved many questions about these potential pros and cons
of ACEs. This section discusses what is known and unknown about ACEs'
likely performance-mainly from the perspective of payment reform, but
ending with an extended discussion of ACEs as a quality reform.
A.

Arguments Against ACEs

Consider first the arguments against ACEs, largely raised against their use
as a payment reform to replace the tort system for many injuries. The earliest
and most basic objections of infeasibility have been most thoroughly laid to
rest. Only the "first generation" of largely conceptual research left much
doubt that ACEs are a practical alternative. 42 Subsequent work has made
clear that experts can readily agree on avoidable adverse outcomes for listing,
certainly in surgery and in obstetrics/gynecology. 4 3 Moreover, the listings
have been successfully applied in practice to both medical and insurance data
44
on injuries.
39. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 214-17 (Harvard U
Press, 1985).
40. Id at 214.
41. This is a long-standing argument with regard to full no-fault coverage. See, for example,
David Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 Duke LJ 1179, 1193-94. It
was first empirically supported by Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, Report on the Feasibility Study (cited in
note 5), specifically dealing only with broader no-fault, however. For more explicit attacks on selective
no-fault, see Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston,
eds, Liability: Perspectives and Policy 101 (Brookings Institution, 1988); Am Med Ass'n, A Proposed
Alternative (cited in note 10); Carter G. Phillips & Elizabeth H. Esty, A Fault-Based Administrative
Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims: The AMA-Specialty Society Medical Liability Project's
Proposaland Its Relevance to the Crisis in Obstetrics, in Rostow & Bulger, eds, Liability and ObstetricalCare at
136, 138-40 (cited in note 29).
42. See sources cited in note 15.
43. The American Bar Association Commission reached this conclusion over ten years ago with
regard to orthopedic and general surgery. See Am Bar Ass'n, Feasibility Study at 5 (cited in note 10).
So has at least one more recent review, Latz, 10J Legal Med at 495 (cited in note 29).
44. The authors have applied ACE listings in several relevant contexts. See, for example,
Boyden & Tancredi, Identification of DCEs at 21-22 (cited in note 16) (mid-1970s closed-surgical claims
data from the compilation made by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners); see also
M. Patricia Sowka, ed, NAIC Malpractice Claims: Medical Malpractice Closed Claims 1975-1978 (Nat'l
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Nor are opponents correct that ACE listings can include only a few
obvious injuries. It is true that the most obvious outcomes, ones that could be
res ipsa cases, are included, but the list goes well beyond that. As Table 1
showed, ACEs encompass quite a broad spectrum of cases, including
problems of both commission and omission. Inclusion of a number of

omissions as ACEs is one way that the third-generation lists have advanced
over early conceptualization. 45 Thus, ACEs should logically apply to many or
most current malpractice claims. This expectation is borne out by the only
detailed ACE analysis of liability claims information: 46 for obstetrics, ACEs
appear to cover at least half of current tort claims. Moreover, also contrary to
the prior arguments of critics, the ACEs disproportionately included major
injuries: among ACEs were two-thirds of the permanent serious injuries,
47
comprising about three-fourths of the indemnity paid in tort.
ACE opponents also seem wrong in assuming that the current tort system
easily resolves ACEs. Obstetric ACE injuries in fact took somewhat longer to
settle in tort than did non-ACEs, and their defense cost much more per
case. 48 Such delay is consistent with having more consequential injuries,
which are slow and expensive to resolve under the current tort system. At
least for obstetrics, it therefore appears that great savings on time and
expense of administration are feasible, contrary to ACE opponents' intuition
49
that ACEs should settle readily, even in tort.
Ass'n of Ins Commissioners, 1980) ("NAIC Malpractice Claims"); Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265 J
Am Med Ass'n at 2838-43 (cited in note 17) (closed obstetrical claims files); Randall R. Bovbjerg, et
al, Finding Medical Injuries in Medical Records: Applying Lists of Avoidable Bad Outcomes to Medicare
Hospitalizations (submitted for publication 1991) (hospital records on Medicare surgical admissions)
("Finding Medical Injuries").
45. Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, for example, commented on how the first generation of
selective no-fault focused almost entirely on problems of commission. Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen,
Report on the Feasibility Study at 3-5 (cited in note 5), citing Havighurst, 1975 Duke LJ at 1233-80 (cited
in note 15).
46. This information comes from our investigation of how obstetric ACEs would work in
practice, Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265 J Am Med Ass'n (cited in note 17). We studied a
population of over 300 obstetrical malpractice claims files, all those closed during 1983-89 within a
large, national, self-insured hospital chain. Claims files originating in twenty-three U.S. states and
the District of Columbia were included, and mothers' races and ages resembled national norms. So
the population studied seems representative. The ACE listing was applied by trained nurse-claims
abstractors, who also noted demographic data pertaining to the injury and economic information.
47. Id at 2839. Large-dollar cases predominated among obstetric ACEs. In part, ACEs' higher
levels of severity occur by design. For reasons of maintaining objectivity, the definition of ACEs
builds in a minimum threshold of significance, below which medical causation and avoidability
become muddled. See Boyden & Tancredi, Identification of DCEs at 28 (cited in note 16): Tancredi &
Bovbjerg, Creating a Selective System (cited in note 13). In our analysis of sampled Medicare
hospitalizations, about half the injuries located were ACEs and they did not differ in severity from
non-ACEs, see Bovbjerg, et al, Finding Medical Injuries (cited in note 44) (but noting problem
generalizing to entire universe of Medicare).
48. ACEs composed about 44% of non-litigated cases, some 66% of cases where suit or
arbitration was begun, and all four of the observed trials. Defense costs averaged $21,000 per ACE
case, as compared to $6,000 for non-ACE cases. See Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265 J Am Med
Ass'n at 2839 (cited in note 17); see also discussion at Part IVB2.
49. This finding for obstetrics cases from one reasonably large and representative set of claims
needs to be replicated elsewhere. According to a colleague, ACE-like cases in Florida appear to
settle short of a trial more often than other cases. Personal communication from Frank A. Sloan,
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ACEs and Cost

Would any ACE-based alternative payment system for medical injuries
cover so many claims as to make its costs politically infeasible? The
contention that it would is the last and most important objection. Note first
that opponents rely mainly on theoretical arguments rather than empirical
evidence. No one has yet applied any ACE listing to a full set of information
on medical injuries, in part because good, population-based research on
injuries is extremely rare. 5° Because direct evidence is lacking, a more
complex, indirect analysis is needed.
1. The Extent of Medical Injury and Medical Litigation. The initial concern
about any "no-fault" system in medicine is that so many bad outcomes occur
naturally, regardless of medical intervention. 5' For one thing, natural deaths
most often occur in hospitals. The subset of bad outcomes that are medically
caused is much smaller, as is the further subset that are due to medical
negligence. Yet even the limited category of negligent medical injury seems
to contain far more cases than currently appear in the tort system. The main
evidence here comes from reviews of hospital medical records, first for
California in 1974,52 most recently for New York in 1984. 53 Some 4 to 5
percent of hospital charts show evidence of a medically caused injury, and
about 1 percent of the total show negligent injury-seemingly a low
proportion. When applied to the large number of hospitalizations, however,
one percent works out to eight or ten times more cases than the
corresponding number of malpractice claims made. 54 This failure to deal with
Vanderbilt University, October 1990. Some risk managers also report that they try to settle ACE-like
cases quickly.
50. The authors have collaborated with researchers elsewhere to seek funding to apply ACEs to
information on medical injuries in New York hospitalizations during 1984. These data were
compiled by the Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers (cited in note 5), and
comprise the only known broad-based and current data base on such injuries. Bovbjerg, et al, Finding
Medical Injuries (cited in note 44), also examined hospital injuries from the perspective of avoidability,
but lacked a generalizable sample.
51. See sources cited in note 38.
52. Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, Report on the Feasibility Study (cited in note 5).
53. Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers (cited in note 5).
54. Don Harper Mills has long pointed out that for California in 1974, the estimated number of
actual negligent injuries found in hospital charts outnumbered that year's meritorious malpractice
lawsuits by about ten or more to one. See, for example, Don Harper Mills, Comments on Where We Stand
and What We Know, presented at an Urban Institute conference, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private
Sector Find Relief, Washington, D.C. (February 21, 1985). Patricia Danzon published a similar
calculation in her October 1985 book. Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 20-25 (cited in note 39). She
estimated a 1974 ratio of 1:10 for all claims to negligent injuries and 1:25 for paid claims to injuries
(comparing the estimate made by Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, Report on the Feasibility Study at 98-101
(cited in note 5), with the NAIC aggregate insurance data from 1975 to 1978, Sowka, ed, NAIC
Malpractice Claims at 6 (cited in note 44). These rough estimates did not match years of injury
occurrence or account for injuries not discoverable in hospital records.
The New York Study made a more refined comparison, matching individuals in 1984 with
corresponding insurance claims records for 1984 incidents. This process found a ratio of all claims to
negligent injuries of between 1:7 and 1:9. Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and
Lawyers at 7-24 to 7-41, especially Table 7.7 (cited in note 5). For the study's critique of Danzon, see
id at 7-2 to 7-5. The study also found that most of the malpractice claims involved hospital
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most negligent injury is one of the major weaknesses of the current system,
for purposes of both compensation and deterrence, as already noted.
It is not known with certainty why so many cases of negligent injury are not
brought as claims or lawsuits. Presumably, some incidents go unrecognized
as negligence. Some patients do not need tort compensation (especially for
minor injuries already compensated by health and disability coverage 5 5), or
are not litigious. And some cases are not worth the high costs of tort process
(especially minor injuries and marginally provable claims 56 ). In any case, the

hospital injury studies make clear that a full no-fault plan would cover far
more injuries than are discovered and brought under today's fault system.
Accordingly, the California study concluded that full no-fault was
unaffordable, but its authors specifically noted that they were not assessing a
selective system, 5 7 like ACEs. The New York study concluded that a limited,
"catastrophic" version of no-fault (limited to disabilities over six months
duration and secondary to all other payers) would cost about the same as the
current fault system. 5 8 Of course, for any alternative system, the estimation of
additional costs and savings necessarily must go far beyond the simple
question of number of cases to consider the amount of payment per case, as
well as administrative costs.
2. Specific Costs Under ACEs. What evidence exists on ACEs? It is helpful to
consider the various costs and savings likely under ACEs, as systematically set
forth in Table 2. The first of two new dollar costs is that of ACE cases already
discovered and brought as tort claims, but not now paid under the tort
system. The only available evidence here relates to obstetrics claims. For one
major hospital chain, 35 percent of obstetric ACEs already receive payment
under the tort system, 59 so that any new ACE payment system would have to

cover the 65 percent not now paid. However, these "unpaid" ACEs generally
involve much less severe injuries, conservatively estimated to cost less than 30
percent as much per case. 60 So the net cost would rise by only about half,
admissions whose records had not been found to involve negligent injury as defined by the study
protocol. Id at 7-36 to 7-37.
55. Injury and claims data suggest that more severe injuries are more likely to be brought as
claims. Recall that California hospital claims for 1974 were only 10% as numerous as negligent
hospital injuries, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text. For three categories of temporary injury,
however, the ratio was only 6-8%, whereas for four categories of permanent injury, it was 11-17%. For
death, it was 6%. Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 23, Table 2.4 (cited in note 39).
56. One instructive piece of evidence here is that death cases seem the least likely of all to be
brought as claims; there are only 5.8% as many claims as negligent deaths. See, for example, id.
This suggests either lack of need (for example, no ongoing medical expenses and likely cash death
benefits available) or low legal benefit/cost ratio (for example, restrictive legal rules on wrongful
death and survivorship claims).
57. Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, Report on the Feasibility Study at 5 (cited in note 5).
58. Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers at ch 8, 8-79 (cited in note 5).
59. The 35% ACE success rate mav seem low, given that our expert consultants rated all ACEs
as at least 70% avoidable. We note in passing that an even lower 18% of non-ACEs received any tort
compensation. This disparity is evidence that the tort system, far from being random or pernicious,
effectively comports with epidemiological notions of avoidable injury.
60. The unpaid ACEs are estimated to be worth the same amount, under current rules of
damages, as paid ACEs of the same severity of injury, as scored on an objective nine-point scale.
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even assuming ACEs were paid at tort-system valuations of loss. 6 1 Moreover,
there are indications that this increase would be less elsewhere than in the
hospital obstetric claims that provided this estimate.
TABLE 2
COSTS AND SAVINGS UNDER AN
FISCAL IMPACT

ACE

PAYMENT REFORM
Comments

DOLLAR COSTS
Injuries not now paid that receive payment as ACEs:
(a) Unpaid ACEs now in system
(b) New cases brought in ACE system

OB study shows small dollars here because
smaller cases
Must estimate "inducement" factor, likely to
be disproportionately small cases

DOLLAR SAVINGS
Fewer cases:
Fewer injuries, hence ACE cases, in long
run

Savings come from improved quality, better
deterrence

Lower indemnities:
(a) Iower losses per case because of earlier
intervention & rehabilitation
(b) Less non-pecuniary loss allowed for
ACEs
(c) "Scheduled" economic loss for ACEs,
other economizing rules

This is a key attribute of accelerated ACE
payment and avoidance of fault finding; exact extent imponderable
Clear savings available; can only estimate
extent
Presumably savings available; again, indeterminate

Lower expenses:
(a) "Defense" side of ACEs
(b) Claimant side of ACEs

Other savings:
"Defensive medicine" curtailed under ACEs

Substantial savings almost certain, can be estimated in various ways
Presumably similar to defense side; dollars directly saved through changes in damage
rules
Effect has value beyond the monetary; precise
monetary extent uncertain; unclear current
defensiveness & likely cutbacks

DOLLARS UNCHANGED
Non-ACE cases remaining in the tort
system or other alternative

Numbers brought and amounts obtained
might stay the same, but might also drop

The second, and more problematic, new dollar cost is that of new cases
"induced" to be brought by the existence of an easier, faster, less unpleasant
system (but one paying less per successful claimant). The fear traditionally
Unpaid ACEs then have an average imputed value of under $200,000 per case, as compared to more
than $700,000 for paid ACEs. This estimate is conservative because more severe injuries are more
likely to be paid than less severe ones, so that unpaid ACEs may tend to be in the lower end of their
injury category.
61. Under ACEs, however, it is expected that damages will be more controlled. See discussion
at notes 107 to 114.
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expressed is that new cases not now pursued as claims could "come out of the
woodwork" in unmanageable numbers. Undeniably, ACEs used for payment
reform would expand compensation to some extent. That is a major goal of
reform. Just promulgating a list should make injuries easier to recognize as
compensable; how much easier can only be estimated. Many have argued that
"no-fault" would unacceptably raise claims frequency. 62 Clearly, full "nofault" would greatly expand coverage. But on its face the criticism is far less
valid for ACEs, which are not part of the comprehensive system of social
insurance but rather a limited extension of the ability to collect for
preventable medical injuries.
Just how many cases would appear under ACEs? On the strength of this
inducement effect, there is only indirect evidence. 6 3 Our data on obstetric
ACEs by stage of resolution are relevant to this issue. The instructive bits of
evidence from this study involve cases now brought, not by requests for
payment from injured patients or their lawyers, but rather by medical
providers or risk managers. Consider the cases opened without a formal
claim and closed before the start of any legal process. Such "preclaim" cases
are not well represented in some claims studies, 64 and they most closely
resemble the "unbrought" cases of concern here. Among ACEs, the ratio of
formal claims to preclaim cases (about 4:3) is higher than among non-ACEs
(1:1). Thus, claimants seem somewhat more likely to find ACEs than nonACEs, and it is plausible that fewer ACEs go unfound by the current system
than do non-ACEs. Looked at in another way, claimants found a higher share
of ACEs relative to those reported only by medical professionals than
claimants did of non-ACEs. This finding suggests that ACEs are indeed more
readily recognizable than liability cases in general. However, additional work
would strengthen this finding, especially to address the suspicion that many
65
potential claims of all kinds are not found.
62. Mills, 128 W J Med at 260 (cited in note 5); Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 213-19 (cited in
note 39).
63. The best answer would come from a survey of medical care, not a survey of liability claims like
the obstetric data discussed in text. There is little such evidence, and the authors are assisting in a
broad-based study of medical outcomes, using New York hospital data, see Harvard Medical Practice
Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers (cited in note 5); our narrower study of selected Medicare
hospitalizations could not illuminate this issue, see Bovbjerg, et al, Finding Medical Injuries (cited in
note 44). In the meantime, a reasonable upper-bound estimate of ACE incidence is the excess of
negligent injuries from the hospital studies over corresponding liability claims. The eight- or ten-toone ratio of injuries to claims seems overdone, as ACEs seem to consist of generally more severe
injuries, for which the ratio is lower, as is discussed in footnotes 66-68.
64. For example, US Gen'l Acct'g Office, Claims Closed in 1984 at 15 (cited in note 31) ("claim"
does not include cases for which no formal demand for payment was made by any claimant). The
General Accounting Office had to limit its definition to make "claims" consistent across the
numerous insurers in its study.
65. In one sense, the preclaim reports should capture much of the medical injury that does not
now become formal claims. Medical professionals are encouraged to report even potential cases, by
their hospitals for quality reasons and by their insurers for liability and risk management reasons.
Further, they can do so without instigating a lawsuit. However, most risk managers feel that too few
significant outcomes are in fact reported, see Orley H. Lindgren, Ronald Christensen & Don Harper
Mills, Medical MalpracticeRisk Management Early Warning Systems, 54 L & Contemp Probs 23, 25 (Spring
1991); Laura L. Morlock & Faye E. Malitz, Do Hospital Risk Management Programs Make a Difference?:
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There are also indications that "unbrought" cases disproportionately
involve less serious injuries. In our obstetrics study, the preclaim ACEs (and
non-ACEs) involved less severe injuries than those in which a formal claim
was brought. 66 This pattern is consistent with earlier findings 6 7 and with
expectations about the severity of unbrought cases: clearly, claimants have
more incentive to notice an injury that has large physical and economic
consequences and to consult an attorney about bringing a claim. Moreover,
we found that more severe obstetric injuries were disproportionately likely to
receive payment 6 8-which also currently gives large cases more reason to be
brought than small cases. Thus, there are reasons to believe that the new
cases under an ACE system can be expected to be disproportionately less
serious cases, so that an ACE payment system would not be inundated with
large new claims.
Empirically, we conclude that the "inducement" objection is at best
overstated, but this conclusion is tentative. We also suspect that the
inducement effect will vary with circumstances. It is logical, for instance, to
expect obstetric ACEs not to provoke as many new claims because "bad
babies" now are easier for lay people to recognize than are other bad
outcomes. As obstetricians often complain, having less than a perfect baby
can readily raise parents' suspicions, although clearly not all sue, contrary to
the more expansive claims of the medical fraternity.
To conclude the discussion of induced increases in claims frequency,
consider three qualitative observations. First, an ACE payment system
intentionally seeks to broaden compensation. ACEs are meant to reach those
injuries that are logically the responsibility of the medical system, as the
current system so drastically fails to do. Second, it is unreasonable to
compare the cost of an ACE-based payment reform only to the cost of today's
liability system. The current tort system may not be bearing the cost of the
numerous negligent or avoidable injuries not now brought as claims. But
someone is, whether an insurer like Blue Cross or Social Security or the
individual injured person and his or her family. To the extent that ACEs
bring this cost within the ambit of medical responsibility, they are shifting an
existing cost, not creating a new one. That is, any increase in ACE versus

Relationships Between Risk Management Program Activities and Hospital Valpractice Claims Experence, 54 L &
Contemp Probs I, 5-6 (Spring 1991), so we lack confidence that the preclaim cases discussed in text
represent most medical injuries.
66. Most preclaim obstetric cases were temporary injuries, most postclaim ones permanent.
Bovbjerg. Tancredi & Gaylin, 265 J Am Med Ass'n at 2839 (cited in note 17).
67. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 22-25 (cited in note 39). Nonetheless, although cases of
permanent injury, for example, are more likely to appear as claims today, such claims are still
outnumbered by nonclaims, by a margin of almost 6:1 (less than the overall 10:1). See id at 21, 23,
Tables 2.1, 2.4.
68. Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265J Am Med Ass'n (cited in note 17). This corroborates the
findings of the General Accounting Office. See US Gen'l Acct'g Office, Claims Closed in 1984 at 41,
Table 3.3 (cited in note 31).
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liability spending is matched by an equal and opposite decrease in someone
69
else's non-liability spending.
Third, any bulge in claims under ACE coverage would be temporary: a
proper assessment needs to consider, not just any one-time increase in the
flow of claims through a changed insurance system, but also the dynamic of
any future changes. Despite temporary lulls, the history of the tort system has
Likewise, other systematic
been one of inexorable expansion. 70
compensation reforms, such as workers' compensation and the New Zealand
plan, have also been characterized by continuing expansion of those adverse
outcomes that are automatically compensated by these systems. 7' In disputes,
payers tend to prefer to compensate injuries, rather than to refuse to do so
and create additional administrative expenses. 72 In contrast, under the ACE
system, inclusion of adverse outcomes is professionally determined. Medical
providers evaluate the relative avoidability of adverse outcomes from an
epidemiological perspective, under which constraints on expansion are built
in. Professional criteria and oversight limit inclusion on ACE lists, even in
those cases involving boundary issues.
3. Specific Offsetting Savings Under ACEs. The costs just noted need to be
offset by the likely savings under ACEs noted in Table 2. For a start,
instituting an ACE-based payment or quality reform will in the long run tend
to reduce the number of cases, by reducing the number of injuries. This
prediction is necessarily unproven at this point, but follows logically from
73
ACEs' likely quality incentives, discussed below.
Next, in several ways, an ACE payment reform should reduce indemnities
paid per case. ACEs are designed to encourage new, faster medical
intervention and dollar payments to support non-medical needs, such as wage
replacement, education, homemaker services, and transportation. This
should speed rehabilitation and, hence, save money. Savings should also
accrue from changes in payment rules and process, such as limited payments
for pain and suffering, specified offsets for the nontaxable nature of insurance
69. It is not intended that an ACE system allow double recovery for the same loss. Either there
should be collateral source offset for ACEs or collateral sources should be notified and allowed
subrogation-or some mix of payment responsibility should be set. See Havighurst & Tancredi, 51
Milbank Mem Fund Qat 152-56 (cited in note 15). The observation is not new that someone bears
the cost of injury, no matter whether or how it is compensated. Compare Guido Calabresi, The Cost of
Accidents (Yale U Press, 1970) (key social goal in assigning responsibility is to minimize cost of
accident plus cost of accident avoidance). However, when an injury is moved into the tort system,
costs rise considerably; a large share of tort costs consists of a monetization of nonpecuniary injury
ordinarily borne only in nonfiscal form, and the system also imposes extremely high carrying charges
of investigation and litigation. The same should not be true for an ACE-based system.
70. See, for example, Priest, 96 Yale LJ at 1521 (cited in note 1).
71. A. P. Blair, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The Law Relating to Compensation for Personal
Injury by Accident in New Zealand (Butterworths of New Zealand, 2d ed 1983); Geoffrey W.R. Palmer,
Compensation for Incapacity: .4Study of Law and Social Change in Veu, Zealand and Australia (Oxford U
Press, 1979).
72. Remarks of Patricia M. Danzon, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Annual Meeting on
Medical Malpractice Project (Washington D.C., October 1990).
73. See Part IVC.
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payments, regularized calculation of present value of future losses or use of
periodic payments, and the like.74 The exact extent of potential savings is
uncertain, but surely it is rather large compared with allowances under

current rules of damages, especially for nonpecuniary losses. 7 5
Another likely economy under ACEs is lower expenses per case on claims
administration and litigation. The cost of defending claims will fall
considerably under ACEs. Malpractice litigation is expensive on both sides,
even where cases do not go to trial. 7 6 On the defense side, for example, our

obstetrics claims data showed an average defense cost (technically, "allocated
loss expense" or payments to outside lawyers and investigators) of about
$50,000 per paid ACE case, and $21,000 per case for all ACEs (paid and
unpaid). 77 These ACE amounts were about triple those for resolving nonACEs (some $18,000 and $6,000 respectively, for paid and unpaid cases). 78
How much could be saved under an ACE system where all defendants would

be under one insurance reckoning? Perhaps the expense per paid obstetric
case would be reduced to that of currently unpaid ACEs (or about $5,000);
perhaps the cost would fall further, to about the level of non-litigated cases in
our data, or about $1,100 each. In any case, savings would be substantial.
Alternatively, consider how liability insurance costs compare with other
insurance costs. All together, obstetric cases in our study averaged 17 percent
of indemnity for allocated loss expense. Industry-wide data for medical
malpractice insurance show an even larger rate-averaging 33 percent for
1980-85, and rising to 43 percent

for

1988. 7 9

In stark contrast, the

74. See discussion of damages at notes 107-14.
75. On the large role played by nonpecuniary losses, see generally Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank
A. Sloan &James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering, "83 Nw U L
Rev 908 (1989). It is hard to calculate the non-pecuniary losses involved in any single claim. Claims
adjusters settle entire injuries as a lump sum and do not indicate just what amounts are allowed for
different elements of loss. Conventionally, analysts subtract dollar losses written in the record from
the total payment (including present value of periodic payments). However, this does not allow for
the fact that settlement bargaining normally discounts claims values in various ways. For these
reasons, our obstetric ACE study did not attempt to compute economic versus nonpecuniary losses,
even though we had access to actual claims files.
For data using the conventional approach, see US Gen'l Acct'g Office, Claims Closed in 1984 at 45,
Table 3.6 (cited in note 31) (showing positive nonpecuniary losses paid up to economic loss level of
$100,000, but negative above that level-for example, for economic loss of $1 million and more,
average indemnity was $439,000).
Another way to estimate savings on nonpecuniary losses is to consider that such damages are
commonly assumed to pay plaintiffs' lawyers' fees. On savings there, see notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
76. See also Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging theJury's Shadow, 54 L &
Contemp Probs 43, 53-59 (Winter 1991).
77. Bovbjerg, Tancredi & Gaylin, 265J Am Med Ass'n at 2840 (cited in note 17).
78. Id.
79. Bovbjerg, et al, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 5 (cited in note 32). The loading just for ACEs is
lower (presumably because their indemnities are relatively high)--"only" 14%. Although the dollar
cost of settling ACEs is much higher per case than for non-ACEs, the percentage is lower, because ACE
indemnities are so very high relative to non-ACEs (a ratio of 7.6:l1-an even greater disparity than
the difference in average expense of 3.5:1). However, opponents of the ACE concept can take no
comfort from this observation, for the ACE percentage is lower only because ACE indemnities are so
high, and the relevant figure for considering potential savings from more efficient claims resolution is
the much higher absolute number of dollars not spent on resolving ACEs.
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comparable rate for workers' compensation insurance is about 11 percent; for
group health insurance, about 5 percent.8 0 Additional savings could be
expected in other insurance costs, like general overhead, but we have no
direct way to estimate them.
On the claimants' side of the ledger, large savings can be expected in the
contingent fee and legal expenses a claimant must pay a lawyer out of an
award. A typical fee for most states is 33 percent. In some states, malpractice
fees are limited by a sliding fee that declines with the size of the award, to a
marginal percentage as low as 10 percent (as in California for portions of
awards above $200,000).1 Under ACEs, if a claimant used a lawyer at all, the
fee could be expected to be far lower, perhaps the 15 percent allowed in
Indiana for the no-fault recovery there in large cases from the Patient
Compensation Fund 2 or the lower fees associated with workers'
compensation cases.

Thus a substantial savings seems readily achievable

here.
Another source of savings is cutbacks in defensive medicine, that is, extra
tests and procedures ordered more for legal defense than for medical efficacy.
Under ACEs, doctors and hospitals should be able to achieve cutbacks on
such spending-if patients and payers successfully insist on them once legal
pressures are reduced by ACEs. 8 3
Finally, Table 2 notes a general presumption that those cases not reformed
will not change in any way. That is, non-ACE injuries will not increase or
decrease in number or in size of damage payments. In reality, expecting a

dynamic shift seems more reasonable. Some might argue that lawyers will
greedily bring new fault cases to make up for the old ones lost. This simplistic
view seems highly improbable: ACEs will not make residual fault cases easier
to prove or more profitable for lawyers to bring. If any type of case is
profitable for lawyers to bring after ACEs, then it must also be profitable now
as well, so it is probably already being pursued-or is likely soon to be
pursued as the tort system continues to expand.
Instead, the most likely dynamic effect would cut the other way: ACEs may
well make residual fault claims harder to win because of subtle cultural shifts in
attitudes about medicine and fault. Once an ACE system is implemented and
generally appreciated, claimants, lawyers, judges, and jurors are likely to
understand that obvious problem cases are no longer in the tort system.
Given such attitudinal shifts, a new de facto presumption about medical
causation and responsibility will arise that could make tort claims harder to
prosecute, even without de jure change. This prediction of savings is not
certain, but is certainly more reasonable than the contrary expectation of
higher residual tort costs.
80.
81.
82.
54 L &
83.

Id.
Calif Bus & Profess Code § 6146 (1987).
Eleanor D. Kinney & William P. Gronfein, Indiana's Malpractice System: No-Fault by Accident?,
Contemp Probs 169. 174 (Winter 1991).
On reduced incentives for defensiveness, see text accompanying notes 33-35 and Part IVC.
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Advantages of ACEs

Having canvassed evidence on the alleged disadvantages of ACEs, we
return briefly to their advantages. Most of the advantages listed above fit
within the three main categories of better compensation (broader-based, more
even-handed, faster); better process (cheaper to administer, faster, less
unpleasant, and less subject to abuse); and better prevention of injury or deterrence
(because of being professionally generated, with an outcomes orientation and
greater medical credibility).8 4 Evidence on the likely comparative cost and
speed advantages of ACEs was presented immediately above in Parts IVB2
and 3 in countering objections of high cost.
The other advantages necessarily remain a matter of theorizing rather than
empirical documentation so long as ACE processes exists only in theory. But
we repeat that the advantages make logical sense.8 5 An actual, operational
"field test" is needed to demonstrate many of ACE systems' positive
attributes for payment reform in practice. Ultimately, operational testing is
also needed to consider effects of ACEs as a quality reform, to which we turn
next.
1. Quality Reform: ACEs, Practice Guidelines, and Defensive Medicine. In the long
run, the greatest benefit of ACEs may be as a quality measure. After all, the
best response to medical injury is to prevent it, not to compensate it after it
occurs.8

6

ACE-based systems' quality improvements may come as an adjunct

to payment reform, as insured institutions or specialties respond to new fiscal
responsibilities with new efforts at quality control. Alternatively, ACEs could
be implemented as a separate reform of quality only, with no direct impact on
the tort system's resolution of injuries. Either way, ACEs could be
implemented institution by institution, state by state, or, conceivably, at the
8
federal level.

7

The main point is that ACEs are an outcomes-oriented, systematic
way of ordering practitioners' responses to low-quality outcomes of care.
In many respects, ACE development resembles the burgeoning moveand practice guideoutcomes assessment 8
ments for medical
84. See generally Part IVC.
85. For example, it is completely logical that an insurance-style ACE-based payment system
could resolve cases faster than the current system. The existence of an ACE list would facilitate
prompt discovery of injuries to begin with. Thereafter, there would be no need for the
extraordinarily detailed fault-finding of the current system. The calculation of damages would also
be simplified. Moreover, payments could begin immediately because providers would not fear
thereby admitting liability as they now do. All this would encourage prompt discovery of injury and
early intervention-which should reduce the extent of harm actually incurred, especially in the very
serious cases of permanent injury that account for the bulk of today's indemnity.
86. This point assumes that prevention is not unduly costly.
87. To assume that payment reform could occur institution by institution is to assume special
enabling legislation or to accept that tort reform can be accomplished by private contract, as urged

by Professors Epstein and Havighurst, among others. See Bovbjerg & Havighurst, 49 L & Contemp
Probs I (cited in note 28) (symposium).
88. See, for example, 9 Health Care Financing Review Annual Supplement (1987)

(symposium

issue). ACEs are not unlike outcome measures sought for quality purposes. See generally Paul S.
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lines. 89 A key difference is that ACEs are generated within an organized
framework of very focused, practical, and ongoing outcomes monitoring. If
quality reform is part of payment reform as well, the need to determine fiscal
responsibility will also help focus attention and motivate compliance. ACEs
will both promote quality and reduce defensiveness.
2. Promotion of Quality. The ACE approach focuses attention on outcomes
and also provides a framework for assessing and encouraging quality care in
medical practice. Its systematic listing of avoidable classes of outcomes makes
professionals think in terms of statistical outcomes on a continuing basis, not
just for one-time research on quality of care. Such lists can be used to
monitor the incidence and prevalence of adverse outcomes in health care
institutions and private clinical practice, and thereby provide a basis for
comparison among providers of care. ACEs would both identify problem
areas of practice and, unlike research or even guidelines alone, would create
incentives to rectify these problems.
Many ACEs give positive guidance about appropriate care, thus
incorporating a kind of guideline. This is especially true for those ACEs that
include elements of procedures in their definition, identifying general
patterns of practice that should be followed or averted. Most of these cover
problems of omission rather than commission. For example, the following ACE
for orthopedic surgery incorporates a procedure and explicitly refers to lowquality medical intervention that induces untoward outcomes: "Wound
infection from failure to treat a compound fracture with antibiotics." The
desirability of treating with antibiotics is clear.
In other cases, ACEs will strongly encourage the development of
guidelines. For all ACEs, the implication of a sub-quality procedure is clear,
at least when compared to the statistical aggregate (the putative norm) of
similar interventions. The patterns of ACE occurrences will help determine
what particular practices are associated with high and low incidence and
thereby encourage adoption as guidelines of practices found to be superior.
The following ACE illustrates the point: "Spinal cord paralysis secondary
to any anterior cervical discectomy." If a proper anterior cervical discectomy
had been performed-which would include those procedures associated with
the preparation of the patient (such as proper diagnostic measures)-spinal
cord paralysis would have been avoided in the vast majority of cases.
Although the ACE does not explicitly detail standards for patterns of practice,
the ACE statistically implies deflections from quality care and thereby strongly
encourages the development of such standards. The encouragement will be
strongest for those medical interventions related to the avoidable ACE
outcomes, but will also exist for injuries not included in the ACE listing.
Moreover, related guidelines for quality will inevitably be broader than the
Sanazaro & Don Harper Mills, A Critique of the Use of Genetic Screening in Quality Assessment, 265 J Am
Med Ass'n 1977 (April 17, 1991).
89. See sources cited in note 25.
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beginning listings of ACEs. For instance, whereas an ACE applies to
instruments left within a patient's body, quality guidelines prompted by this
category would begin to deal with such matters as problems resulting from an
instrument falling into the body, even where it was subsequently discovered
and removed. The resulting guidelines may be institution-specific or
jurisdiction-wide, and their admissibility into courtrooms will vary. 90 But the
result, whether enforced through malpractice law, ACE process, or
professional culture, should be improved care and lessened defensiveness.
The impact of ACEs would occur in several phases: first, the mere fact of
ACEs would help focus attention on avoidable bad outcomes in covered areas
of medical care. Second, a research-like phase would compile data and
monitor performance. Third, feedback of data, through education, sanctions,
or encouragement, would help to determine and alleviate underlying causes
of ACE problems. Fourth, under payment reform, fiscal incentives would
augment professional ones.
3. Reducing Defensive Medicine. ACE reforms should cut defensive medical
practices. Defensive medicine is essentially a response to the ambiguity of
current standards of care, as applied in a legal process that providers find
unpleasant and unpredictable. Where ACEs supplant legal process to govern
payment, doctors need not fear liability, and unproductive defensiveness has
no reward, as already noted. 9 1 ACEs have many of the virtues of guidelines in
terms of reassuring practitioners that they will not be held liable arbitrarily for
bad outcomes. Moreover, it is a criterion in the process of creating ACE
listings that they have no undesirable incentive effects, which should preclude
92
their creating new incentives for defensive medicine.
Nonetheless ACEs should also have an impact even where a residual tort
system survives after ACE reform or where ACE reform has not sought to
replace the current tort system for medical injuries-because ACEs are
focused on quality reform alone, for example. The reason is that improved
quality signals will reduce the need for unproductive, legally oriented
defensiveness even as they improve medical practice, and, eventually,
outcomes of care. By highlighting appropriate procedures, such standards
would isolate and discourage the use of unnecessary and unproductive
interventions, which can lead not only to inconvenience and expense for the
patient, but also even to injury from invasive procedures (using dyes,
90. ACEs themselves, especially where used for nontort payment purposes, might not be
considered probative in a tort proceeding. See, for example, James A. Henderson, Jr., Uses Of DEC
Lists, in Am Bar Ass'n, Feasibility Study at 49-51 (cited in note 10). However, broader quality
guidelines, especially where adopted as the practice of an institution, seem quite likely to be
admissible. Practice guidelines are often explicitly designed to have influence in tort cases. See
sources cited in note 25.
91. See text accompanying notes 33-35. Note that ending the purely legal incentive to be
defensive may not end defensiveness, which continues to be rewarded by the earnings associated
with defensive procedures. The same is true for all legal reforms.
92. We recognize that defensive medicine is a complex issue and there are many reasons for
defensiveness. See Tancredi & Barondess, 200 Science 879 (cited in note 4). Therefore, ACEs alone
cannot eliminate defensiveness, but they can make a strong contribution.
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catheters, and the like). ACE-induced guidelines have the additional
advantage of growing out of a specifically outcomes-oriented approach, which
is generally conceded to be the appropriate orientation of quality incentives
wherever practicable. 9 3 In contrast, much of the conventional impetus for
guidelines derives from utilization review, attempts to control medical
94
spending by penalizing length-of-stay outliers and the like.

Once set, these practice standards would help provide the quality
backdrop in malpractice cases for determining when medical interventions
have deflected from acceptable care, even if they were not formally admissible
in evidence. 95 As such, ACE-generated standards of practice may be nearly as
influential in minimizing unnecessary procedures as would ACEs, were they
accepted as a replacement for much of the tort system.
V
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR TESTING

ACEs are ready for actual demonstrations of their effects. As part of
planning for implementation to proceed, some additional systems design is
needed. Remaining details are not conceptually difficult, although they will
take time and willing support from implementing states, hospitals, HMOs, or
other entities. This section briefly considers these prerequisite steps; full
implementation will call for more detailed elaboration. A payment reform
that replaces much or most of the current tort system through mandatory
legislation calls for the most additional preparation. Voluntary adoption of
ACEs for other reforms requires less.
A.

Further Refinement and Expansions of ACE Listings

The first step toward implementation of any ACE-based reform is to
further improve the current ACE listings. As now constituted, they are
sufficiently well specified for research applications by well-motivated and
disinterested analysts. But they need some additional work before they will be
comprehensive, specific, and reliable enough for uses that affect rights and
responsibilities in the real world. This is true whether large sums of money
are at stake, as in payment reform, or whether only hospital monitoring of its
staff's own inpatient practice is involved.
Start with comprehensiveness. The three medical specialties for which
ACEs have been created are the most important: general surgery, orthopedic
surgery, and obstetrics and gynecology are the top three in frequency of
93. See generally, Office of Technology Assessment, The Quality of Medical Care: Infonnation for
Consumers (US Gov't Printing Office, June 1988).
94. See, for example, Kinney & Wilder, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 421 (cited in note 25); Troyen
Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Mlalpractice Litigation: Collision o" Cohesion?, 16 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L
67 (1991).
95. Voluntary use of definitive standards can be expected to aid in reliable and less expensive
settlement of cases short of trial. This is what underlies the value of ACEs for dispute resolution and
for screening panels.
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current malpractice claims against physicians. According to the national GAO
survey of 1984 closed claims, 96 these three specialties account for 33 percent
of all claims against doctors. However, no specialty treats patients completely
in isolation. Although the generation of ACE lists must be specialty specific to
be professionally credible, ACEs in practice need to apply to episodes of
patient care that involve numerous specialties.
Hence, it is important to expand the listings to related specialties, starting
with those that directly complement the three specialties already covered.
These areas include anesthesia, which often accompanies childbirth or
surgery, radiology, pathology, and possibly also emergency room care.
Adding these four specialties, accounting for an additional 15 percent of
current claims against physicians, would bring the total to nearly one half of
all claims. 97

It is also desirable to include areas of medicine that offer

alternatives to ACE-covered specialties, so as not to skew clinical choices
among them-including nurse midwives along with obstetricians, and nurse
anesthetists along with anesthesiologists. Along these same lines, the ACE
lists need to be recast in patient rather than physician terms, that is, written to
be applicable to episodes of patient care regardless of the specialties involved
in diagnosis and treatment.
In the future, other categories of surgery, such as plastic surgery, urology,
ophthalmology, neurosurgery and otolaryngology should be added.
Ultimately, it seems desirable to cover all of inpatient care as well as its
outpatient care substitutes, such as surgicenter or urgicenter care. ACEs for
care completely outside the hospital environment are a longer term goal. 98
Next, it is important to improve the drafting of ACEs for practical
implementation. This drafting will include both improvements of medical
precision and sensitivity to the legal factors that must be considered for
creating an implementable list. Areas of ambiguity need to be addressed, or
they will foment disputes potentially requiring litigation or other expensive
processes to resolve.
Action also needs to be taken to improve the professional/political
credibility of ACE listings. This means using a more formal process to
promulgate listings (and developing mechanisms for periodic updating) and
otherwise convincing the professions and the public that the methodology is
sound. There must be widespread confidence that the lists accurately
comport with the stated criteria of avoidability and that they can be fairly
implemented in practice. A particular concern is that different reviewers
applying the same list should reach the same result in most cases (a standard,
incidentally, by no means met by the current system of litigation). This calls

96.
97.
98.

US Gen'l Acct'g Office, Claims Closed in 1984 at 54, Table 4.2 (cited in note 31).
Id.
Most malpractice is associated with hospital care. See, for example, id at 24-35, Table 2.8.
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for some further preliminary testing of ACEs on actual cases during planning
for implementation. 99
B.

Decisions on Administration and Financing

Any ACE reform must also specify its administrative design. As for other
injury-payment systems, a number of models are feasible. Administration,
financing, and bearing of risk about uncertain future losses-all these can be
either public, private, or a combination of the two. Today's liability system
features public-private administration (trials and settlements of courtsupervised litigation), but private risk bearing (through insurers) and
financing (through providers' premiums), although there have been public
interventions in the insurance markets. No-fault auto insurance reform, on
the other hand, sought to make liability determinations more private by
minimizing litigation, continuing private financing and risk bearing as well. In
the workers' compensation reform model, administration is public (by an
agency), but risk bearing and financing are private. Premiums are paid to
private insurers, which assume the risk of meeting future obligations
determined by the public agency's process. As a final example, for Social
Security disability coverage, administration, financing, and risk bearing are all
public.
Choosing among such options is a matter for an implementing jurisdiction
to decide. We expect that many or most will prefer public administration as
under the workers' compensation model for reasons of political culture and
constitutionality (the latter in the expectation that many courts would look
askance on replacing litigation with private insurance). 0 0 Private financing
and risk bearing, also on the workers' compensation model, seem likely in
many or most states because of the recent public distaste for "on-budget"
financing' 0 ' and because private malpractice insurance is so well
02
established.'
99. Applying the improved ACE listings to respected data bases will help establish their power
through processes such as testing of "inter-rater variability," as social scientists term variation in
judgments. This examination will be essential in determining the robustness of the ACE approach as
a scientifically acceptable method for addressing compensation and accountability. Further research
is underway to begin to address inter-rater variability. See note 63.
100. A full discussion of the constitutionality of different specifications of ACE-based reform goes
beyond the scope of this article. We note in passing that the judicial record of even conventional,
"less of the same" tort reforms is better than their reputation would suggest. Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis
L Rev at 547-48 (cited in note 6). For good discussions of state court approaches, see David R.
Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: ConstitutionalAttacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 Okla L Rev
195 (1985) (judicial reactions to conventional tort reforms as of the mid-1980s); Bovbjerg, Sloan &
Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 965-74 (cited in note 75) (more recent judicial trends and more
thoroughgoing reform proposal).
101. Recent political history, especially at the federal level, is of course an object lesson of
opposition to new tax-funded initiatives. See, for example, R. W. Apple, Jr., The Big Vote Isfor "No, "
NY Times Al, col 4 (November 8, 1990); Andrea Stone, Voters Turn Tight-Fisted; Theme: "Hold Line on
New Spending," USA Today AI, col 4 (November 8, 1990). There are indications that state voters can
support new initiatives where they are clearly specified and receive limited funding.
102. The same private insurer could be responsible for both tort liability and ACE responsibility
for the same type of claim. This would raise special problems of gaming, wherein obligations might
be shifted whichever way was more fiscally advantageous. Of course, the ACE/tort boundaries would
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Another part of administration is the process by which the administering
entity makes and applies decision rules. The ACE listings are the most central
set of rules, but many others are needed, including a way to update the
listings periodically. In a public model, most such choices are matters of
administrative law that would be addressed only after enactment of enabling
legislation. This article accordingly does not seek to specify anything like a
full set of operating procedures. We do wish to re-emphasize, however, that
the appropriate model to follow is generally that of first-party insurance or
social insurance rather than a formal adversarial process like litigation. (In
this regard, workers' compensation, with its adversarial case-by-case methods
of determining injury and causation, seems a less useful precedent.)
Basically, ACE processes should be informal, although some formal
investigatory powers are needed (whether created by law or by private
contract), and there should be an internal dispute resolution and appeals
mechanism of some sort. Judicial appeals should be strictly limited-to
something like the abilities to sue for breach of contract (for private process),
or to obtain judicial review of public administrative decisions for arbitrary and
capricious behavior (for public process). There should not be routine access
to courts for a new fact-finding procedure; the goal is an alternative system
05
with different standards for decisions, not a pretrial screening process.'
With regard to financing, as a matter of principle, medical providers and
other defendants in medical injury actions should pay for much if not most of
the system, although there is also an argument for some subsidy, 10 4 even for
be pushed from both directions by patients and providers, in any case, depending on which was more
advantageous in a particular case. ACEs are meant to be robust and objective enough to resist such
border maneuvers.
103. We note here that it is anticipated that the medical system would itself take notice of ACEs'
occurrence and take appropriate actions. In this regard, there is a need to improve medical records'
usefulness as documentation of injury. For our ACE research, we compared the medical records of a
large medical center with subsequent risk management/legal defense records about the same
hospital services. We found evidence of some medical problem in the majority of cases that later
attracted legal attention, but not necessarily the same problem as was complained about. In every
case, it was far easier to understand events and reach judgments about the likely avoidability of harm
using the legal records. This is perhaps partly explained by providers' fears that too vigorous
disclosure in discoverable records could hurt in court. Compare Stanley J. Reiser, The Influence of
Malpractice Litigation on the Safety of Patients, in Robert E. Litan & Peter W. Huber, eds, The Liability
Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 227 (Brookings Institution, 1991). It may also
partly explain why the New York study did not find better accord between legal filings and hospital
records. See note 54. In any event, medical records need improvement to help serve an ACE-based
payment system or ACE-based monitoring system.
104. Fiscal incentives linked to credible statistical patterns and guidelines for improvement
definitely should motivate improved outcomes. However, fiscal responsibility could also promote a
disinclination to cooperate with an ACE system or even outright evasion and refusal to enter key
aspects of bad outcomes in medical records. Hence, there is justification for preventing the fiscal
impact of any one case from being too large. One possible source of subsidy for physicians is the
hospital. Keeping the fiscal responsibility at the hospital level would also maintain deterrence within
the medical system. Compare Myron F. Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in
the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 Duke L J 1305, 1327-28 (quality incentive of
institutional liability). Also, it may well be harder tor an institution to be uncooperative than for an
individual.
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public contribution. 0 5 One goal of ACE-based reform is to improve fiscal
signals for deterrence, as well as to clarify professional responsibility through
the lists. How much providers pay should depend on their risk classification,
as under today's liability insurance. Moreover, rates should partly reflect
insureds' personal or institutional experience under the system. Again, such
merit rating is a goal of ACE-based reform. A particular issue for
implementing entities to address is how multiple practitioners involved in a
single event should split their responsibility, eventually to be reflected in
premiums. Self-insured hospitals that cover their medical staffs face this issue
today. Where possible, we would prefer to leave this matter to private

decision. 106
C.

Rules on Damages

To implement an ACE payment system, new rules of damages will be
needed also. Conceptually, ACEs lie between a fault-based deterrent system
and a full no-fault compensation system like the New Zealand system or
workers' compensation. Damage amounts therefore should logically be less
than under the fault-based system, but higher than those under full no
fault.' 0 7 Politically, it may also be important to raise payment levels above
workers' compensation amounts, which can seem very low relative to tort
norms.' 0 8 Procedurally, the process of settling ACE claims should strive to
achieve similar results in similar cases. The key to this is developing objective
rules and applying them even-handedly.
Current judicial practice makes juries (and private negotiators) treat each
case's losses as wholly idiosyncratic and gives virtually no guidance based on
previous results.' 0 9 Not only are resulting damage awards frequently unfair
as between similar cases, but the system also makes outcomes extremely hard
to predict for litigants and insurers alike. In contrast, an insurance system
based on ACEs should be able to achieve far more even-handed and
predictable results.
Consider, first, injured parties' pecuniary losses. The goal here should be
to compensate them reasonably without having to engage in lengthy and
expensive arguments about imponderables. Past expenses can be reimbursed
at documented levels. Many losses, however, even pecuniary ones, are not
105. Public contribution can be justified by the public interest in curtailing medical defensiveness
and in promoting improved quality signals, both in connection with public health and in
administration of the largest medical payers, Medicare and Medicaid. The justification is stronger if
particular new procedures are adapted along with ACEs to address defensive medicine. However,
physicians have no general claim on public revenues to pay insurance bills.
106. Prior writing has also addressed these issues. See Havighurst & Tancredi, 51 Milbank Mem
Fund Q at 129-30 (cited in note 15); James A. Henderson, Putting the DCE Lists to Work: Alternative
Approaches to Establishing a Compensation System for Victims of Medical Accidents, in Am Bar Ass'n, A
Feasibility Study at 53 (cited in note 10).
107. Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 917 (cited in note 75).
108. Adopting workers' compensation approaches to damages, however, does have the virtue of
being judicially familiar and having passed constitutional challenge. Personal communication with
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell.
109. See generally id.
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precisely ascertainable, even with individualized courtroom trials. These
include imputed values (like lost housekeeping services of a family's
caregiver) and future losses (such as disability and medical care). Future wage
loss should be standardized insofar as possible, to avoid guesswork and
disputation. Future services should to the extent possible be paid as incurred,
preferably with incentives for cost containment. It should be possible to
assure continuing payment of the needs of the severely injured, while letting
market forces determine appropriate discount rates and other elements of

valuing future losses.1 10
It should also not be difficult to standardize the approach to frequently
occurring ACEs. In particular, for "bad baby" cases, the valuation of wage
loss anticipated should be scheduled so as to treat unfortunate children alike,
and medical need determinations could begin from standardization of
expectations developed by experts within an implementing agency or
insurer. II I
A major open issue is what rules should apply to losses met by collateral
sources. Many states have begun to require offsetting recoveries from private
insurance from liability claims. In no case should there be recovery by injured
people, which can reward malingering." 2 Offset reduces malpractice
premiums, but does not make medical providers fully responsible for their
failure to prevent avoidable problems in the ACE context. A different
approach would be to pay such losses, but to pay them back to whatever other
third party had already incurred them, or to pay them on a periodic basis for
losses to be incurred.
Second come nonpecuniary losses, including pain and suffering, loss of
enjoyment of life, and inconvenience. Such losses are very real despite their
intangible nature; people are willing to make financial and other sacrifices to
avoid them, so they should be recognized in some fashion.' 13 But by their
nature they are not amenable to conventional methods of valuation, nor
should full tort valuation be adopted. Hence, the scheduling approach seems
especially promising. Systematizing such valuation will make payments evenhanded and help minimize disputes. One approach is to use a matrix of
relative values derived from severity of injury and likely duration, perhaps
110. James F. Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damagesfor PersonalInjuries: A Common Law of Damages and Insurance Contractsfor Future Services, 8 Yale J
Reg 171 (Winter 1991).
11.
For a research-oriented approach to standardizing expectations of future costs in two highcost types of cases, see Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in
Medical Malpractice, 54 L & Contemp Probs 131 (Winter 1991).
112. On the extent of offset provisions, see Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 526 (cited in note 6);
on their effect on premiums for liability coverage, see Stephen Zuckerman, Randall R. Bovbjerg &
Frank A. Sloan, Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27
Inquiry 167 (1990). For a debate on collateral source offset versus subrogation by the collateral
sources, see Am Bar Ass'n, Feasibility Study at 8, 66-67 (cited in note 10) (Commission for offset;
Professor Anderson for subrogation).
113. Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes ofAge: Will the System Survive?, 83 Nw U L Rev 876, 87889 (1989).
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measured by age.' 4 The amount of compensation is a matter of social choice
for each jurisdiction or entity adopting an ACE-based payment reform.
Considerably lower limits for the upper end of injuries seem appropriate,
while some organized allowance for lesser injuries also seems proper.
In all, a successful approach to damages will require a marriage between a
good set of general rules and a reasonable practice for implementing them.
Any process will have to make judgments about borderline cases, to address
new problems unforeseen in the drafting of the rules, and provide periodic
updates of damage allowances.
D.

Estimating the Incidence of ACEs

The most troublesome outstanding issue about an ACE-based payment
reform is the extent of the inducement effect.' 1 5 To address this question
better, we need to know the incidence of ACEs, as now defined and after
refinements in the listings. Incidence plus extent of injury as measured under
a set of damage rules will determine system cost. Questions about cost are
apt to make it necessary to investigate further as states and other
implementing entities consider assuming or imposing new fiscal ACE-related
obligations. Good prediction will be of the essence if there is to be private
risk-bearing, as insurers simply will not underwrite a novel form of coverage
without credible expectations, public reinsurance, or both."1 6 Public funding,
on a pay-as-you-go basis, could begin operations without the same degree of
actuarial confidence, as Indiana's Patient Compensation Fund did in 1975.17
Yet, today's politicians and taxpayers want not dissimilar reassurances about
cost as well.
Hence, a major implementation-planning task is to assess ACE incidence
in one or more areas. Applying the improved ACE listings to respected data
bases will provide us with additional information on the incidence of these
events in various contexts and under different definitions of ACEs. Plans are
under way to do so." 8
E.

Moving to Implementation Through Demonstrations

ACEs' potential value has been well documented. However, some
practical uncertainties and doubts remain, and different social value
judgments are possible about implementation. Hence, the logical strategy is
to approach a full payment reform only incrementally. Payment reform might
best begin with a single area of medical service, such as childbirth, a particular
problem under current liability practice.' ' 9 Moreover, if ACEs show their
114. Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 938 (cited in note 75).
115. See Part IVB2.
116. Clarity of payment rules, as well as a body of data on which to base actuarial projections, will
be very important for a scheme to be implementable.
117. Kinney & Gronfein, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 186 (cited in note 82).
118. See note 50.
119. See generally Rostow & Bulger, eds, Liabilit1v and ObstetricalCare (cited in note 29); Bovbjerg,
Tancredi & Gaylin, 265 J Am Med Ass'n 2835 (cited in note 17). Virginia and Florida have indeed
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practicability through the "lesser" reforms-for quality monitoring, as well as
voluntary reform of insurance and dispute resolution-the way will be paved
for subsequent adoption of payment reforms based on ACEs. We expect
payment reform to be approached through step-by-step demonstrations
rather than through immediate, global reform.
Thus, ACE lists can be refined and tested before large sums of money
depend on the resolution of boundary disputes. The likely incidence of ACEs
in particular hospitals or states can be ascertained before new financial
responsibility for them is established. And damage rules could be modeled
before being actually enforced in practice. Still, to make these kinds of
further progress, the ACE concept needs to move from research and law
reviews into reality, in the form of practical demonstrations. This strategy
calls for one or more states or large private entities to adopt an ACE-based
strategy for one or more of the uses described here.
VI
CONCLUSION

The ACE approach to malpractice reform has evolved during three
generations of development. First came early conceptualization. Next, ACEs
and implementing systems were more fully specified and applied in
preliminary fashion. The most recent research has seen expanded listings,
more structured professional development, and the first empirical testing on
detailed sources of information about medical care and liability insurance.
ACEs now exist for obstetrics/gynecology, general surgery, and orthopedic
surgery.
ACEs' use as a payment reform has been more discussed than its uses for
improving dispute resolution, insurance practice, or quality assurance.
Research to date, most notably for obstetrics/gynecology, has confirmed that
ACEs:
-

-

-

-

are definitely feasible to develop and apply in research;
will almost certainly cover more injuries on a more regular basis
than the liability system;
can clearly remove most serious injuries and most dollars from
litigation, at least in obstetrics, which is a major problem area;
can almost certainly achieve administrative savings on handling
each claim;
are rather unlikely to promote large numbers of expensive new
cases; and
will almost surely mean less aggravation for all concerned.

reformed tort law for childbirth, listing one very narrowly defined category of adverse outcome for
no-fault payment.
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ACCELERATED COMPENSATION EVENTS

ACE-based payment reform to replace much or most of the tort system would
combine improved compensation with improved deterrence. A reformed
insurance system would improve payment for today's avoidable injuries; and
its more credible, outcomes-based incentives for practitioners would help
avoid tomorrow's. All this seems possible without the major drawbacks of a
fault-based system of litigation.
Payment reform thus holds both near-term and long-term benefits, for
both patients and practitioners-quite unlike conventional tort reform, which
simply curtails tort remedies in the short run. Yet ACEs can do more than
provide a viable basis for an insurance alternative to the (appropriately)
beleaguered tort system with respect to most serious injuries. ACEs can also
help improve existing insurance practice and legal processes as well as
promote better quality monitoring and feedback-even short of replacing
most of the tort system.
Most of the arguments against ACE payment reform have been effectively
addressed. At this point, the probable merits and possible shortcomings of
ACEs are well documented, at least in research terms. What remains to
establish is the robustness of any ACE system in practice and the expense of
medical injuries it could cover as an alternative to the existing tort system.
(ACEs would also supplement or supplant the non-tort funds that provide
most help to victims of medical injury.) ACEs exist and are now ready for
their final "fine tuning" prior to actual implementation. ACE reforms merit
demonstrations that their virtues will survive the move from theory to practice
and that any problems are manageable. Further ACE development will
proceed best under the spur of real-world exigencies.
The next generation of ACE work needs to convince practical peoplestate legislators as well as health care providers-that versions of ACEs
deserve the chance to demonstrate their practicality on their own. As a way of
protecting against the down-side risk of potentially high-budget (but low net
cost) payment reform, we expect reforms to start with less thoroughgoing
uses and to work up to full applications as a payment reform. Only practical
experience can make definitive assessments. It is time for field tests.

